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Merged ﬁrms are typically rather complex organizations. Accordingly, merger has a more
profound effect on the structure of a market than simply reducing the number of competitors.
We show that this may render horizontal mergers proﬁtable and welfare-improving even if
costs are linear. The driving force behind these results, which help to reconcile theory with
various empirical ﬁndings, is the assumption that information about output decisions ﬂows
more freely within a merged ﬁrm. This induces a commitment advantage for the merged ﬁrm.
INTRODUCTION
Although merger of two ﬁrms is frequently dubbed ‘fusion’, this term is quite
misleading. In contrast to the fusion of atoms, the new entity that results from a
merger of two ﬁrms is usually a much more intricate structure than either of the
two ﬁrms. Through merger ﬁrms do not just become ‘bigger’, they also become
more complex organizations. This is empirically well documented. Prechel et al.
(1999), for example, report that newly merged ﬁrms mostly move from the
classical multi-divisional form
1 to the so-called multi-subsidiary organizational
form, where the old ﬁrms are kept as still fully functional afﬁliates.
2
The economics literature generally ignores such organizational issues and
models a merger either as a fusion or as perfect collusion.
3 In this paper we
depart from both and draw on the above ﬁndings by modelling a merged ﬁrm
as a ﬁrm with separately managed subsidiaries. We analyse how this affects the
market structure, proﬁtability of ﬁrms and welfare. The main assumptions we
make about mergers are very minimalistic. We do not assume any cost
reductions on the production side that are known to be a possible reason why
mergers can be proﬁtable. Instead, we simply assume that within a merged
ﬁrm information is exchanged more easily than between other ﬁrms.
4 More
speciﬁcally, we follow the observations by Prechel et al. (1999) according to
which merging ﬁrms become afﬁliates in a holding company, with each afﬁliate
having the discretion to make independent decisions; and we assume that,
owing to the many formal and informal links between these afﬁliates, one
afﬁliate’s production plans can be observed by the other afﬁliate before this
information is observable for ﬁrms that do not belong to the same holding
company. Moreover, we allow for some time structure in production decisions.
As a consequence, an afﬁliate among the merged ﬁrms might be able to observe
the output decision of its ‘sibling’ before deciding about its own output.
As innocent as this assumption may seem, it has dramatic consequen-
cesFfor the two merging ﬁrms as well as for the market as a whole. In
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proﬁts of outsiders, and enhances welfare. All three results are in sharp
contrast with the literature on mergers in markets with quantity competition
that originated with Salant et al. (1983), and at the same time they help to
reconcile theory with three stylized facts:
1. There is no clear evidence for welfare reductions as a consequence of
mergers: welfare changes go in both directions (see, e.g. Pesendorfer 2003,
who reports huge welfare gains for mergers in the paper industry, and, for a
general appraisal, Federal Trade Commission 1999).
2. Competitors often suffer when other ﬁrms merge (see e.g. Banerjee and
Eckard 1998).
3. (Bilateral) mergers are observed in all industries, even in those where costs
are unlikely to be convex (see Ofﬁce of Fair Trading 1999).
There is a vast body of theoretical literature on mergers and some strands of
it can accommodate some of these ﬁndings. For example, Deneckere and
Davidson (1985) show that bilateral merger in Bertrand markets is proﬁtable.
This can explain why we observe bilateral mergers. However, they also show
that merger in these markets reduces consumer welfare and that competitors
beneﬁt if other ﬁrms merge.
5
The literature on mergers in markets with quantity competition (Cournot
markets)
6 is, however, at odds with all three observations. In Cournot markets
mergers have only two consequences. First, they reduce the number of ﬁrms (or
strategic players) acting in the market, as mergers are indeed modelled as
fusion. Second, if costs are nonlinear, they may change the cost function of the
newly merged ﬁrm. This has a number of important implications.
  Mergers are welfare-improving only if ﬁrms are asymmetric and output is
shifted from less to more efﬁcient ﬁrms (Farrell and Shapiro 1990).
  Competitors beneﬁt if other ﬁrms merge (Salant et al. 1983).
  Bilateral mergers are proﬁtable only if costs are sufﬁciently convex (Perry
and Porter 1985).
A corollary to this is that bilateral mergers in linear markets are never
proﬁtable and always welfare-reducing (Salant et al. 1983). Consequently, one
should expect to observe mergers only if the cost savings are sufﬁciently large,
which seems to be in conﬂict with the third observation aboveFthat there is
merger activity in all industries regardless of speciﬁc production technologies.
Cost effects are very hard to observe and measure. Accordingly, it is difﬁcult or
impossible to test this theory. In order to eliminate possible production cost
effects from our consideration, we will consider the case with linear cost.
7 We
propose a different reasoning, which resolves the puzzle but is based on
assumptions that can be tested more easily. As we shall show, the puzzle can be
resolved by taking into consideration the fact that merger is not a process that
transforms two ﬁrms into one ﬁrm of the same type, essentially eliminating one
of the ﬁrms, but rather leads to a different organization: merged ﬁrms are kept
as intact decision units within a more complex entity.
Our analysis is in two parts. In the ﬁrst, we assume that the merged ﬁrm has
joint headquarters that can govern its afﬁliates. In particular, we assume that
the HQ can enforce the sequence in which its two afﬁliates decide about their
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(which then, because information ﬂows freely between the two afﬁliates, will be
informed about the quantity of its sibling when making its own decision). This
has an important consequence for the market as a whole, because the market
will no longer be a simple Cournot market: rather, it will have the ﬂavour of a
Stackelberg market, as the afﬁliate that decides ﬁrst becomes some sort of
Stackelberg leader. Of course, this leadership is only partial, as the outsiders
will not be able to observe what the second-moving afﬁliate can observe.
Accounting for this pattern, we will introduce the following terminology.
We shall call the ﬁrst-moving afﬁliate of the merged ﬁrm a ‘partial Stackelberg
leader’ and the second moving afﬁliate a ‘partial Stackelberg follower’ (or the
‘informed ﬁrm’). All the other ﬁrms we shall refer to as ‘Cournot ﬁrms’ (or the
‘uninformed ﬁrms’). Analysing this market, we arrive at the above mentioned
main conclusions: that mergers can be proﬁtable and welfare-improving even if
all ﬁrms have the same linear cost functions. At the same time, competitors’
proﬁts are reduced. We shall refer to such a merger as merger with commitment
by governance.
In the second part of our analysis we will relax the assumption about the
all-powerful joint headquarters.
8 In fact, we shall completely abandon it (which
might even more closely resemble a multi-subsidiary form), and we will show
that even in the absence of a headquarters the same timing of decisions that the
headquarters would enforce will evolve endogenously. Consequently, the same
Stackelberg commitment power will result endogenously, and hence the same
market outcome. Thus, even if the merged ﬁrm does not beneﬁt from
‘commitment by governance’, it will increase its joint proﬁt as it beneﬁts from
‘endogenous commitment’. Accordingly, we shall refer to this type of merger as
merger with endogenous commitment.
The model we employ in the second part of our analysis is related to the
literature on endogenous timing in Stackelberg markets. It closely follows
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), who show that two perfectly symmetric ﬁrms
may play endogenously according to the Stackelberg solution. This happens in
a two-period model in which both ﬁrms can commit themselves to a quantity in
the ﬁrst period. Alternatively, they can decide to wait and produce in the
second period (then knowing the other ﬁrm’s decision). The only subgame-
perfect equilibria in this market game that are in undominated strategies are
characterized by Stackelberg behaviour.
9
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we present
the basic model and the benchmark case without merger. In Section II we
describe the equilibrium outcome if ﬁrms merge and are governed by a
headquarters that can impose rules for them. In Section III we abandon this
assumption and study the model in which the timing of moves is endogenous.
Section IV presents some empirical evidence in favour of our model. Finally,
Section V summarizes and concludes.
I. THE BENCHMARK CASE WITHOUT MERGER
We consider a market for a homogeneous product with linear demand and
cost. Let there be n symmetric ﬁrms. We can normalize price and unit such that
2004] PROFITABLE HORIZONTAL MERGER 577
r The London School of Economics and Political Science 2004inverse demand can be written as p(X) ¼ max{1   X, 0}, with X ¼
Pn
i¼1 xi
denoting total supply and xi ﬁrm i’s individual quantity.
Each ﬁrm chooses its supply quantity according to the following game
structure. There are two production periods. A ﬁrm can choose to produce either
in period 1 or in period 2. Production costs do not depend on whether a ﬁrm
decides to produce early (in ‘period 1’) or late (in ‘period 2’). Only after period
2Fthat is, when all ﬁrms have chosen their outputsFcan each ﬁrm observe each
other ﬁrm’s output decision and the market opens. This reﬂects that production
and sale do not take place instantaneously (as is assumed in most of the
economics literature). Rather, production takes some time and precedes selling.
However, although actual output decisions may not necessarily occur
simultaneously, owing to simultaneous information revelation, the output
choice in the benchmark case is a standard Cournot–Nash game. Accordingly,
the unique Cournot equilibrium is given by xn
i ¼ 1=ðn þ 1Þ. Total supply is
given by X ¼ n/(n þ 1) and the equilibrium price by p ¼ 1/(n þ 1). Firms’
proﬁts are 1/(n þ 1)
2.
Note that the choice of timing of production is inconsequential in this
benchmark case. Given the information assumptions, the benchmark case is
structurally equivalent to the standard Cournot model with n symmetric ﬁrms.
However, the additional choice of timing allows for more structure within
more complex organizational forms. This is what we consider next.
II. MODEL A: HEADQUARTERS GOVERN MERGED FIRMS
Suppose two of the n ﬁrms merge. A ‘holding’ is formed with a joint
headquarters and with decision-making units in each of the two afﬁliates,
labelled L and I. As discussed brieﬂy in the Introduction, the governance
structure in the merged ﬁrms is characterized by two properties. First,
information ﬂows more easily and quickly between the merged afﬁliates than
between other ﬁrms. More precisely, we assume that the two merged ﬁrms can
observe each other’s output decision as soon as it occurs. Second, the
headquarters controls the sequencing of output decisions of the two afﬁliates
and can force afﬁliate L to choose xL prior to afﬁliate I’s decision. Hence when I
chooses xI it knows the choice xL made by afﬁliate L. Of course, all other ﬁrms
observe xL and xI only at the end of period 2, at the same time when L and I also
observe these other ﬁrms’ output choices. This structure is common knowledge.
We refer to a merger that results in a holding with two afﬁliates and this
information and decision structure as a merger with commitment by governance.
The game that results after the merger has taken place is a sequential game
without proper subgames. It can be interpreted as a market with ‘partial
Stackelberg leadership’, and we refer to the ﬁrm in the merger that moves ﬁrst
(L) as the ‘leader’. The second ﬁrm in the merger (I) we refer to as the
‘informed ﬁrm’. All other ﬁrms we refer to as the ‘uninformed ﬁrms’, indexed
u A U. The two stages of the game are as follows.
  Stage 1. The partial leader (afﬁliate L of the merged ﬁrm) chooses its
quantity xL. Firms not involved in the merger (uninformed ﬁrms) either
choose their output or decide to wait.
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chooses its quantity xI afterwards. Uninformed ﬁrms that have decided to
wait in stage 1 also decide about their quantities (without having observed
xL). Once all ﬁrms have decided, the market opens and proﬁts are realized.
With this structure, a strategy of the leader is simply a number, its quantity
xL; the informed ﬁrm’s strategy is a function prescribing for each possible
quantity of the leader a quantity of its own. We denote this function by f(xL).
A strategy of one of the uninformed ﬁrms prescribes, strictly speaking, the
period in which to produce and the quantity that is produced in this period.
However, as an uninformed ﬁrm’s quantity decision is not revealed until the
end of period 2, its choice of period is irrelevant. Hence, we can simplify an
uninformed ﬁrm’s strategy to a number, its quantity xu.
This game has an inﬁnite number of Nash equilibria, similar to a standard
Stackelberg game. In contrast to a standard Stackelberg game, the number of
equilibria cannot be reduced by simple backward induction, i.e. by requiring
subgame perfection. However, by requiring that the informed ﬁrm react
optimally to its information, i.e. by requiring sequential rationality, we can
achieve a unique solution.
As the derivation of the sequentially rational equilibrium is slightly tedious,
we relegate the full analysis of the game to the Appendix. The results are
as follows. The leader supplies xn
L ¼ 2=ðn þ 2Þ. Uninformed ﬁrms choose
xn
u ¼ 1=ðn þ 2Þ; and the informed ﬁrm chooses the function f nðxLÞ¼
2=ðn þ 2Þ 1
2xL, which yields in equilibrium xn
I ¼ 1=ðn þ 2Þ.
At ﬁrst sight it may seem surprising that uninformed ﬁrms choose the same
quantity as the informed ﬁrm. After all, one might have suspected that the
informed ﬁrm ‘suffers’ more from its knowledge about the leader’s quantity
than the uninformed ﬁrms do. However, in equilibrium this cannot happen.
The key to understanding this property is the following observation. In
equilibrium all ﬁrms know the quantities of all other ﬁrms. (Of course, of the
informed ﬁrm they only know the equilibrium function f
n (xL), but since they
know xn
L they also know xn
I). Thus, each uninformed ﬁrm has to maximize
xuð1   Xn
 uÞ with Xn
 u being the total quantity of all ﬁrms except u. At the same
time, the informed ﬁrm has to choose f(xL) such that xið1   Xn
 iÞ is maximized.
But this implies that the ﬁrst-order conditions for uninformed ﬁrms and
informed ﬁrms are symmetric and xi ¼ xu must hold in equilibrium.
Having solved the market game after the merger, we can now proceed by
analysing (a) whether this merger is proﬁtable, (b) whether it decreases or
increases welfare, and (c) how it affects the proﬁts of the merged ﬁrms’
competitors. These questions are not hard to answer.
In order to analyse the proﬁtability of the merger, we have to compare the
joint proﬁt of the two ﬁrms before and after they merge. Before, the joint proﬁt
is 2/(n þ 1)
2. After, it is 3/(n þ 2)
2. (Simply note that the price after the merger
is 1/(n þ 2).) Thus, the change in proﬁts is
3
n þ 2 ðÞ
2  
2
n þ 1 ðÞ
2 ¼
n2   2n   5
n þ 2 ðÞ
2 n þ 1 ðÞ
2
which is positive if n
2   2n   540, i.e. if nX4.
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producer rents. Owing to linearity and symmetry, social welfare is a monotonic
function of the total equilibrium quantity. Thus, it is sufﬁcient to compare the








ðn þ 2Þðn þ 1Þ
and unambiguously positive. Thus, the merger is welfare improving. Finally,




We summarize our results in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In symmetric linear Cournot markets with at least four ﬁrms, a
merger with commitment by governance is proﬁtable and welfare-improving.
Furthermore, it reduces competitors’ proﬁts.
III. MODEL B: MERGER WITHOUT HEADQUARTERS
We take the same setup as above. Each of the two merged ﬁrms maximizes its
own proﬁt. The only aspect we alter is that the two merged ﬁrms must now
decide autonomously in which period to produce. Since this will lead to the
same market structure as above, we shall speak of a merger with endogenous
commitment. The stages of the game are as follows.
  Stage 1: All ﬁrms, including the two afﬁliates of the merged ﬁrm, either
choose a quantity or decide to wait.
  Stage 2: Any afﬁliate of the merged ﬁrm that has decided to wait in the ﬁrst
stage is informed about the other afﬁliate’s decision in stage 1 and then picks
its quantity. At the same time, uninformed ﬁrms (not involved in the merger)
that have decided to wait in stage 1 choose their quantities (without having
learned anything about stage 1). The market opens, and proﬁts are realized.
Let the two merged ﬁrms be indexed by i and j. Then each merged ﬁrm’s




i either speciﬁes an output for period
1 or indicates that the ﬁrm waits, i.e. x1
i 2 R [f Wg with W indicating the
decision to wait. The function fðx1
j Þ is a mapping R-R specifying the ﬁrm’s
reaction in case it has decided to wait while the other ﬁrm has chosen x1
j 6¼ W.
Finally, x2
i speciﬁes ﬁrm i’s quantity decision for the case in which both
afﬁliates have decided to wait.
10 An uninformed ﬁrm’s strategy can, as above,
be simply described by a number, i.e. its quantity choice xu, which is taken in
either of the two periods.
11
We focus on equilibria in pure strategies. Some observations about possible
subgame-perfect equilibria of this game can now be made.
(1) If one of the merged ﬁrms decides to wait, the other will produce in the ﬁrst
period. (The waiting ﬁrm will adjust its output to the ﬁrst mover’s quantity;
or, to put it differently, regardless of the behaviour of the uninformed
ﬁrms, there is a Stackelberg-leader advantage.)
580 ECONOMICA [NOVEMBER
r The London School of Economics and Political Science 2004(2) In any subgame–perfect equilibrium in which the two merged ﬁrms
produce in the ﬁrst period, all ﬁrms produce standard Cournot quantities
1/(n þ 1). (Otherwise some ﬁrm would obviously not play a best reply.)
(3) The situation in which all ﬁrms produce Cournot quantities in the ﬁrst
period is an equilibrium in (weakly) dominated strategies. (For one of the
merged ﬁrms, playing Cournot in the ﬁrst period can never be better than
waiting. On the other hand, waiting can clearly be better than playing
Cournot.)
(4) If one of the merged ﬁrms decides to wait, i.e. decides to produce in the
second period, it will produce the same equilibrium quantity as each
uninformed ﬁrm. (This follows from the same logic as above.)
Taken together, these observations dramatically narrow down the set of
possible solutions. Most importantly, we ﬁnd that (1), (2) and (3) imply that, in
any subgame-perfect equilibrium in undominated strategies, one of the merged
ﬁrms has to move ﬁrst while the other has to wait. This implies that the same
market structure results as in the case with a headquarters. Consequently, the
ﬁrms will also produce the same quantities so that we get identical market
outcomes as in the case with a headquarters.
Proposition 2. In symmetric linear Cournot markets with at least four ﬁrms, a
merger with endogenous commitment is proﬁtable and welfare-improving.
Furthermore, it reduces competitors’ proﬁts.
IV. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The governance theory outlined in the previous sections makes a number of
predictions that can be confronted with empirical evidence. There are the
stylized facts on the implications of horizontal mergers for competitors’ proﬁts
and welfare outlined in the introduction, which are at odds with standard
merger models and can be reconciled in our framework. Further, our
governance explanation of horizontal merger makes more speciﬁc predictions.
But information ﬂows, timing decisions and governance rules inside ﬁrms are
difﬁcult to observe and to measure, and may require extensive interviews for
gathering data. This makes it difﬁcult to test this theory directly. Nevertheless,
our theory makes two predictions on observable ﬁrm behaviour.
First, it makes a prediction regarding capacity adjustments. As the two
merging ﬁrms choose their quantities sequentially, they should become
asymmetric with respect to their market shares. A truly quantitative analysis
studying this aspect requires plant-level data of a sort that is not, as of now,
available, although the clear prediction of our analysis makes this an
interesting question for further research. However, we can look for some
cases that qualitatively support the implications of our model.
12 We mention
three cases that ﬁt our results nicely and are difﬁcult to explain by synergy
effects. A nice (though slightly gory) example comes from the US meat-packing
industry, where a consolidation wave in the 1980s was accompanied by
signiﬁcant productions shifts to large plants without small plants being shut
down; this is carefully documented in MacDonald et al. (1999). Convex cost
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even. A merger theory based on ﬁxed-cost savings suggests that small plants
are shut down. Our governance theory predicts that mergers induce a partial
shift of production from one plant to another, rendering the distribution of
output across plants more uneven, in line with the observed behaviour.
Similarly, when Pepsi and Quaker merged in 2001, one ﬁrm reduced output
(capacity) quite dramatically (it shut down two out of ﬁve plants) while the
other did not. Some mergers in the automobile industry followed similar
patterns, in particular Volvo–Ford, where Volvo signiﬁcantly reduced capacity
at the time of the merger.
A second prediction regards the organizational structure of the ﬁrm. The
merging ﬁrms need to stay as independent decision-making units, perhaps
governed by a joint headquarters. In contrast, cost advantages and increasing
returns may suggest a fusion of the merging ﬁrms to a single unit of production
and decision-making. Empirical evidence on this aspect is vast; merger between
car producers seems to lead to independent afﬁliates with a joint headquarters.
For instance, neither Volvo and Ford have not fused in the molecular sense,
nor have Daimler and Chrysler. Typically, ﬁrms acquiring other ﬁrms retain
target management (see e.g. Hubbard and Palia 1999), and the multi-subsidiary
form (which is implicitly assumed in our model) has become the standard
organizational form of a merged ﬁrm (see e.g. Prechel et al. 1999, or Zey and
Swenson 1999). As we have shown, such an organizational form may have a
signiﬁcant impact on the structure of the market and can provide a new
rationale for mergers if information ﬂows more easily between afﬁliated ﬁrms
than between unafﬁliated competing ﬁrms.
As pointed out above, we cannot ﬁnd direct evidence regarding the role of
information ﬂows that are crucial in our model. But there is some indirect
evidence. First, there is some evidence that information ﬂow within the merged
ﬁrms is essential for merger success (Tetenbaum 1999). Also, the fact that the
information ﬂow within ﬁrms within a corporation differs from information
ﬂows between independent ﬁrms is documented by the fact that managers are
sometimes even concerned about information ﬂowing too easily within a
corporation, which leads them to build ‘Chinese walls’ (see e.g. Pozen and
Mencher 1993, or Bonham 2000). Second, there are ﬁrms like SynQuest, a large
software house, that speciﬁcally address the needs of merged ﬁrms to enable
information ﬂows: ‘SynQuest provides sophisticated supply chain design and
strategy tools to enable companies with multiple plants, products, warehouses,
distribution centers and production capability to measure and design the most
proﬁtable way to service existing customers as well as new markets’
(www.synquest.com). Such technology will make it easier for ﬁrms to use the
commitment effect that is key to our result, with or without a central
headquarters governing the information ﬂow.
V. CONCLUSION
Standard merger theory is at odds with a number of stylized facts about
mergers. For example, Banerjee and Eckard (1998) ﬁnd that, during the ﬁrst
great merger wave from 1897 to 1903, competitors of merging ﬁrms suffered
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mergers. The observation is, however, consistent with our approach, which
predicts such losses.
Our approach also predicts the opposite of standard models with respect to
the proﬁtability of mergers in a market with linear costs and with respect
to their welfare implications. As the new wave of mergers is still irresistible, we
observe mergers in virtually all kinds of markets, including those where the
constant-returns assumption seems well justiﬁed. In the traditional approach
where one ﬁrm ‘disappears’ after a merger, this is puzzling. But in reality,
acquired ﬁrms rarely disappear. As we have shown, this may have a signiﬁcant
impact on the structure of the market which provides a new rationale for
mergers.
In the ﬁrst part of our analysis we showed that, if a joint headquarters can
govern the (timing of) decisions of its afﬁliates, this may render a merger
proﬁtable even in the absence of cost advantages through the merger. One
assumption drives this result: within a merged ﬁrm information ﬂows more
quickly and freely, and, because of this, clever governance can induce a
commitment advantage for the merged ﬁrm even if no other ﬁrm can observe
what its afﬁliates are doing. In the second part of our analysis we abandon the
assumption of a headquarters and show that, if all ﬁrms are free to choose
when to produce, the same market structure results as in the presence of a
headquarters governing the merged ﬁrm. As in Hamilton and Slutsky’s
(1990) model of endogenous timing (which our model generalizes by
adding uninformed ﬁrms), we observe endogenous leadership. Thus, it turns
out that two simple assumptions which both seem quite realistic make a merger
proﬁtable: that production does not take place at one and the same instant
for all ﬁrms, and that, as pointed out above, a merger may create infor-
mation channels through which afﬁliated ﬁrms can observe what other
afﬁliates do.
We considered two simple ﬁrms that merge and form a more complex
entity (a ‘corporation’) within an industry consisting of n identical Cournot
competitors that are single ﬁrms, where single ﬁrms are units that make
precisely one output decision. The governance mechanism that is revealed,
however, is more general and qualitatively robust. Similar qualitative results
can be obtained if the decision-making entities in the set of competitors have
a different organization structure; for instance, some of them could be
corporations with similar governance structures as the post-merger corpora-
tion that we analyse. To obtain the same qualitative results, it is required that
the aggregate output of the ﬁrm entities that are not involved in the merger and
the two merging ﬁrms’ joint output are strategic substitutes. Also, one may
consider merger of more than two ﬁrms.
13
The policy implications of our analysis are twofold. Socially, mergers may
be more welcome than traditional views suggest. However, this may depend on
the organizational form the merged companies choose. Hence, in judging the
(anti)competitive effect of mergers, governing bodies may wish to be mindful of
how the merged ﬁrm plans to operate.
On a more general level, the model suggests that one can fully understand
the consequences of merger only when carefully considering its consequences
for market structure. If one does, the standard view that mergers have to
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APPENDIX
To solve the game of Section III, let us proceed step by step. First, consider an
uninformed ﬁrm u and let XU denote total output of all uninformed ﬁrms. Its best-reply
correspondence assigns to each possible combination of xL, f(xL) and XUnu ¼ P
i2Unfug xi a unique quantity xu which maximizes xu(1   xL   f(xL)   XU). Thus, ﬁrm





1   xL   fðxLÞ XUnu
  
:
The informed ﬁrm’s best-reply correspondence assigns to each possible combina-





ð1   xL   XUÞ
has to hold. It is important to notice that there is, for each combination of xL and XU,
an inﬁnite number of functions f
n fulﬁlling this condition. The best-reply correspon-
dence demands only that f
n assumes a certain value at one particular point and says
nothing about the shape of the function elsewhere. Obviously, this is the reason for the
multiplicity of equilibria.
However, requiring sequential rationality narrows down the set of functions for
ﬁrm I. Sequential rationality demands that ﬁrm i reacts optimally in all its information
sets. As the information sets of ﬁrm I are singletons, there are no problems of specifying
I’s beliefs. Firm I can only react to what it knows about xL. Taking into account that
(A2) has to hold, this implies that ﬁrm i must choose a function of the form




In essence, this means that, demanding sequential rationality, we now can analyse a
‘truncated game’ where Z is ﬁrm I’s only choice variable. This means that we can rewrite








xL   Z   XUnu
  




1   XU ðÞ :
Notice that (A5) ensures uniqueness.
Next, we can focus on the leader L. In the truncated game its best-reply
correspondence assigns to each combination of Z and XU a unique quantity xL
maximizing xL 1   1




L ¼ 1   Z   XU:





2 1   1
2xn










L ¼ 1   Zn  ð n   2Þxn
u;
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u ¼ 1=ðn þ 2Þ; xn









which yields in equilibrium xn
I ¼ 1=ðn þ 2Þ.
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NOTES
1. Chandler (1962) is usually credited for having been the ﬁrst to conceptualize the ‘M-form’.
A further classical reference is Cyert and March (1963).
2. Zey and Swenson (1999) report similar ﬁndings.
3. An exception is Kamien and Zang (1990), where a single owner can operate a number of
ﬁrms. They show that owners may prefer to run several ﬁrms that are in competition with
each other instead of operating them as one unit. A similar logic underlies Baye et al. (1996),
who show that ﬁrms in Cournot markets have incentives to form divisions.
4. In a recent article, Nault and Tyagi (2001) argue that improved communication tech-
nologies make horizontal alliances and other horizontal organization structures more
attractive and more prevalent than traditional centralized structures. Nault and Tyagi
take this as a starting point for modelling coordination mechanisms in alliances of
geographically dispersed ﬁrms.
5. Cabral (2003) shows that merger in markets with differentiated products may increase
consumer welfare if there is the possibility of free entry.
6. At ﬁrst sight, quantity competition might be seen as of lesser importance than price
competition. However, as Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) show, standard Cournot analysis
might be interpreted as a short-cut to analysing markets where ﬁrms have to build up
capacities and then engage in price competition.
7. This assumption is mainly for purity. We will show that merger is proﬁtable and welfare-
enhancing, even with a linear technology. This result implies that, if there are additional
‘synergies’ (e.g. cost savings arising from the convexity of cost functions), the merger will be
even more proﬁtable. In other words, by focusing on linear technologies we do not restrict
the generality of our analysis, but rather focus on the hardest case, and a generalization to
cases with ‘synergies’ is straightforward.
8. A recent unpublished paper by Creane and Davidson (2000) parallels our analysis in the
ﬁrst part of this paper and assumes that headquarters make the choice of the order of
moves.
9. The main reason for this result is that playing Cournot quantities in the ﬁrst period is a
(weakly) dominated action. (By waiting, a ﬁrm can always react optimally to what its
competitor has done previously.)
10. Note that, as Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), we rule out the case where a ﬁrm that has
chosen to produce in the ﬁrst period can produce again in the second period. This assump-
tion can be justiﬁed by assuming that ﬁrms have to make some arrangements for production
actually to take place and that, consequently, producing in two periods instead of one
causes ﬁxed costs that the ﬁrms wish to avoid. However, our results are nevertheless robust
in the sense that allowing production in two periods would still yield the same outcomes (see
Ellingsen, 1995, for a similar construction).
11. As before, the timing decision of a ﬁrm not involved in the merger is irrelevant, as
information about output decisions before the end of period 2 is available only within the
merged ﬁrm.
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r The London School of Economics and Political Science 200412. In the absence of such evidence, one might, of course, argue that our model is purely
normative and that ﬁrms might not yet have found out how to use the corporate structure
we describe above to make a merger proﬁtable.
13. Matsumura (1999) has studied the endogenous Stackelberg equilibria that can emerge in
Cournot markets with a total number of n42 single ﬁrms. We expect that his results also
apply for the internal Stackelberg structure that may emerge if m ﬁrms form a corporation
of informed but independent decision-makers in a market in which additional Cournot
competitors exist: that is, in the absence of a headquarters there will emerge m   1 partial
Stackelberg leaders who choose their quantities simultaneously in the early period, and one
informed ﬁrm within the corporation that assumes the role of a follower.
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